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The Public Expression of
Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech
Josi G6mez*
1. The Problem
Lesbians and gays' in the United States, because of their sexual
orientation,2 are routinely denied rights unquestioningly accorded
heterosexuals. They are victimized not only in private,' but also in
*Jos6 G6mez re'cehi ed a R. A. dle'.re'eg in Education from the Universitl of W'oming in
19.5 an it J.I. ,iegre.' frnm Harvarl I.uw Sehel in 1981. He''urrenllI s re.q us Ee'cetive
l'ire.'tr of the San Francisco-ieased Human Right. Foundatin andi as Co-chair of th.
Nali,,nal (au ra.sk Firce B,,urd of )irctors. This article was esriginally written for a
liar% rd I .au% SeheIl seminar on fe'de.ral c'h il rights. The author e.xpresse's gratithde' it
I'r,,fe.ss,rrJ,hn H. \lansfi.l for his in.,luable insight anel crilicism. and tp classmates in the
seminar uhi, ire.itled'e helpful omments and stigge'stions. Spae'cial thank!, ulso go to
l'rmfe' ,,r Catharin' A. MacKinnon, whose cogent advice unel invisive anal\ sis imprin'ed
thi. article' imnu.etarahl..
1. The term lesbian in this article refers to women who are "woman-identified." Lesbian,
defined as a women-identified woman, encompasses an emotional, personal, and political
commitment to and for women, as well as a sexual orientation toward women.
Radicalesbians, The Woman Identified Woman, 14 Ladder, Aug.-Sept., 1970, at 6 .Brown,
Take a Lesbian to Lunch, A Plain Brown Rapper 79-95 (1976). Cooke, The Historical
Denial ofLesbianism, Radical Hist. Rev., Spring-Summer 1979, at 64. The kerm gay in this
article refers to males with commitments, bonds, and sexual orientation toward men.
Although many people use the term gay as a synonym for homosexuals of either gender, this
article distinguishes the terms in recognition of and respect for the ideological, political, and
social differences between lesbians and gay'men. For a detailed discussion of these
differences see. T. Marotta. The Politics of Homosexuality 48-68, 229-55 (1981). This
distinction proves to be necessary because the term gay in the Gay Rights Movement and
society in general tends to erase and exclude lesbians and lesbians' feminist concern& Rich,
Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 Signs: . Women in Culture &
Soc'y 631 (1980). Because genital sexuality embraces only one component of total lesbian
and gay personality, this article also distinguishes these terms from the word homosexual.
The term homosexual in this article means 'relating to, or exhibiting, sexual desire toward a
member of one's own sex." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 544 (1981).
2. The term sexual orientation, often used interchangeably with "sexual preference"
refers to one's inclination or interest to direct her/his sexuality homosexually, hetero-
sexually, or bisexually.
3. E.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). affd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (constitutional right to privacy does not extend to sodomy).
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public.' As professionals, they have been impeded from pursuing careers
as doctors, I teachers, 6 and lawyers.7 As military personnel, they have
been discharged, sometimes dishonorably.$ As skilled civil servants, they
have had their security clearances revoked.9 As resident aliens, they have
been deported'0 and denied naturalization." As parents, they have been
denied custody of their own children.' As students, they have been
denied use of school facilities,' 3 and their organizations have been denied
4. EEOC Dec. No. 76-67, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) q 6493 (Mar. 2. 1976)
(employer's refusal to hire male applicant on ground that he is homosexual does not violate
Tide VII); EEOC Dec. No. 76-75, 2 EmpL Pra. Guide (CCH) q 6495 (Mar. 2, 1976)
(where person was discharged due to newspaper article stating that he was arrested for
homosexual activity, employer's refusal to rehire him on ground that he is homosexual does
not violate Tide VII); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(Civil Rights Act of 1964 not violated by employer's refusal to hire male applicant on ground
that he was effeminate); but see Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific TeL & TeL. 24 Cal. 3d
458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (equal protection clause of the California
Constitution proscribes discrimination by public utility based on homosexual orienta-
tion).
S. E.g., McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010. 111 Cal.
Rptr. 353 (1973) (court upheld license revocation of a physician who had engaged in
proscribed homosexual conduct in public; revocation was suspended on condition that the
physician see a psychiatrist).
6. E.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.) (teacher transferred to an
administrative position could not maintain a constitutional challenge under the first and
fourteenth amendments seeking return to his teaching post when he withheld information
concerning his homosexuality on his application), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
7. E.g., State v. Kimball 96 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957) (attorney disbarred for behavior
contrary to good morals and in violation of state laws, thus demonstrating his unfitness to
practice law).
8. Eg., Saal v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (Navy's discharge of plaintiff
because of her sexual relations with another Navy enlisted woman did not violate due
process), cert denied, 102 S. C. 304 (1981).
9. E.g.. Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court suggests that if a
rational nexus is found between an individual's homosexual activity and the individual's
ability to safeguard classified information, a security clearance could be denied).
10. E.g., Velez-Lozano v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (consensual sodomy is a crime of moral turpitude within scope of statute providing
for deportation of aliens convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude within five years
after entry into the United States).
11. Eg., In re Schmidt. 56 Misc. 2d 456, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1968) (alien denied
naturalization because of her lesbian practices).
12. Eg., Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39,119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975) (evidence sufficient
to sustain trial court's finding that award of custody of children to lesbian mother would be
detrimental to children).
13. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (university had denied members
of a student homosexual organization the use of university facilities for a conference and
dance because it was a homosexual organization; the court overturned the university's
action, finding that such denial infringed on the students' rust amendment right ).
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recognition. ' As criminal defendants, they have been denied fair trials."
As prisoners, they have been subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment.'6 As tenants, they have been evicted.'7 As patrons seeking food,
shelter, and recreation, they have been denied enjoyment of public
accommodations.'" As lovers and committed life companions, they have
not been allowed to legitimize their unions under law. 9
Lesbians and gays seeking redress for violations of their civil rights
are often not afforded statutory, judicial, and political recognition or
protection. Federal and state anti-discrimination legislation does not
proscribe discriminatory practices based on sexual orientation. For
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,0 which prohibits
unlawful employment practices, including those by private employers,
does not list sexual orientation as a protected characteristic. Congres-
sional efforts to amend the Act to prohibit sexual orientation as a basis for
discrimination,2' as well as judicial efforts to interpret the Act to include
14. E.g., Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (district court
sustained university's refusal to recognize Gay Lib as a campus organization on ground that
recognition would result in commission of felonious acts of sodomy in violation of Missouri
law), rev'd, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977). cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
15. E.g., State v. Frentz. 354 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1978) (conviction of aggravated crime
against nature with a person under 17 years old reversed because evidence of defendant's
reputation as a homosexual and his alleged homosexual acts with other persons was
prejudicial).
16. E.g., Williams v. People, 43 A.D.2d 531, 349 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1973) (court was not
precluded from transferring an inmate to an institution with accessible rehabilitative
services and resentencing him for an additional year, when the inmate had been segregated,
without rehabilitative services, due to his homosexuality), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 657, 355
N.Y.S.2d 578, 311 N.E.2d 650 (1974).
17. No court cases have been found on this issue. However, evictions based on sexual
orientation were brought to the attention of the author when he clerked for Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), a Boston-based law firm. In addition, government fair
housing offices and human rights commissions routinely receive such complaints. See, e.g.,
San Francisco Human Rights Commission. Sexual Orientation Complaint, Annual Fiscal
Year Report 1981-1982 (Sept. 17, 1982) (unpublished); Human Rights Commission,
Report to the Lesbian/Gay Advisory Committee, Quarterly Complaint Reports, July-Sept.
1982. Oct.-Dec. 1982 (Jan. 25, 1983) (unpublished memoranda).
18. Eg., Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50 (Fla.) (court held valid a Miami ordinance
prohibiting liquor licensee from knowingly employing a lesbian or gay or serving them),
cert. denied. 389 U.S. 1048 (1967).
19. See. e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310. 191 N.W. 2d 185 (1971) (Minnesota's
..marriage' statute not interpreted to include same-sex marriages; the court held this does
not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment), appealdismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972).
20. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
21. Legislation to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include sexual orientation as a
protected classification has been introduced in Congress annually since 1975. The latest
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lesbians and gays as a protected group 2 have been unsuccessful. At the
state level, only Wisconsin 3 has a law that proscribes discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. Other state legislative 24 and judicial
efforts2 ' have failed.
Beyond omitting lesbians and gays from protective legislation,
some federal and state regulations compel their exclusion. For example,
Department of Defense regulations require the discharge of homosexuals
or persons who commit homosexual acts.' Oklahoma 2' provides for
attempt in the United States House of Representatives is H.R. 427, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). which includes protection in the areas of employment, housing and public
accommodation. The Senate version, S. 430,98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), would provide
protection only in employment.
22. De Santis v. Pacific TeL & Tel., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (employer's refusal to
hire or promote a person who prefers sexual partners of the same sex does not violate Title
VII); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (Civil Rights Act of
1964 not violated by employer's refusal to hire male applicant on ground that he was
effeminate). However, Title VII has been interpreted to cover sexual harassment in a same-
sex context. See Wright v. Methodist Youth, 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. I1. 1981). "While
recognizing that same-sex discrimination can be sex-based, this is not exactly a gay rights
ruling. It protects a man's right to be free from homosexuality, not to prefer it." MacKinnon,
Introduction, Symposium: Sexual Harassment, 10 Cap. U.L Rev. i, vii n.23 (1981).
23. This law, which took effect in 1982, prohibits discrimination in employment, housing,
and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §
111.32(5)(1) (West Supp. 1982) (housing), Wis. Stat. Ann. § 924.04(1) (West 1982)
(public accommodations), as enacted by Act of Mar. 2, 1982, ch. 112, 1982 Wis. Laws
901.
24. In several states, legislation which would amend anti-discrimination statutes has failed
to pass year after year. For example. in California the gay employment bill, A.B.1, was
introduced on Dec. 6, 1982 by Assemblyperson Art Agnos for the fourth year in a row.
Attempts at the local level have been more successful. E.g., Minneapolis, Minn., City
Ordinances ch. 139 (Supp. No. 6 1982) (discrimination based on affectional preference
prohibited).
25. In Gay Law Students Ass'n, the California Supreme Court held that California's Fair
Employment Practices Commission, created by the Fair Employment Practices Act, did not
have jurisdiction to address complaints of employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation because it is not gender- based discrimination. Nevertheless, this case stands as a
landmark in lesbian and gay civil rights litigation for its favorable ruling for the plaintiffs on
two other grounds. The court held that employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation violated the state constitution's equal protection clause. This was the first time an
equal protection clause was extended to proscribe discrimination against lesbians and gays.
The court also held that such discrimination violated the Cal. Lab. Code § § 1101, 1102
(West 1971), which protects political activity. The court recognized "coming out of the
closet" as an important aspect of the struggle for equal rights and therefore protected
political conducL. Gay Law Students Ass'n, 24 Cal. 3d at 488, 595 P.2d at 610-11.
In Macauley v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 21 Fair Emp. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) q 30,552 (1979), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the Commission had no
jurisdiction to entertain discrimination complaints based on sexual orientation.
26. For example, in final rules issued by the Department of Defense, separation from
military service is mandatory for homosexual status or for engaging in a homosexual act.
Enlisted Administrative Separation, 32 C.F.R. § 41.13.(1981).
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dismissal of teachers who are homosexual or who advocate homosexual
rights.2"
Foreclosed from statutory relief, lesbian and gay plaintiffs have
pursued constitutional claims with few positive results. Courts have
refused to consider lesbians and gays a suspect class,29 even though they
seem to present all the indicia such a classification requires.3 0 Conse-
quently, courts subject to minimal scrutiny laws, regulations, and
policies which lesbians and gays challenge through this line of equal
protection theory.' Required only to articulate a rational basis for their
27. Okla. Stat. Ann. tiL 70, § 6-103,15 (West 1972).
28. The statute permits the firing of teachers, student teachers, or teachers' aides who have
.engaged in public homosexual conduct or activity." Public homosexual conduct is defined
as "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging, or promoting public or private homo-
sexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to the
attention of school children or school employees." Id.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma has upheld this statute's
constitutionality against a free speech, privacy, freedom of religion, due process, and equal
protection challenge. In rejecting the equal protection claim, the court pointed out that
homosexuals are clearly not members of a yet-identified suspect class, or possessed of some
fundamental right. The court readily found a rational relationship between the statute and
the state's legitimate interest in furthering the fitness of public school teachers. This case is
on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. National Gay Task Force v. Board of
Educ., No. CIV-80-1174-E (W.D. Okla., June 29, 1982).
29. E.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (using
legitimate interest and rational relationship tests, court upheld against due process and
other challenges the constitutionality of Virginia sodomy statute), affd mem, 425 U.S. 901
(1976). In De Santis, a statutory claim brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), the court
gave soine weight to the fact that "[t] he courts have not designated homosexuals a'suspect'
or 'quasi-suspect' classification so as to require more exacting scrutiny of classifications
involving homosexuals." 608 F.2d at 333. The court cited Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney for support. One federal district court has strongly suggested that sexual preference
may he suspect under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 852-53, a statutory action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Ironically, in two California appellate cases involving issues unrelatedto sexual
orientation, the courts cited Gay Law Students Ass'n, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, as
having recognized homosexuality orsexual preference as asuspect classification. Halford v.
Alexis, 126 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1032-33,179 CaL Rptr. 486,491 (1982); Kubik v. Scripps
College, 118 Cal. App. 3d 544, 549-50, 173 Cal. Rptr. 539, 541 (1981). However, the is-
sue of suspectness is nowhere addressed in the California Supreme Court opinion in Gay
Law Students Ass'n. In fact, strict scrutiny is not applied. Applying instead a rationality
standard, the court recognized freedom of opportunity to work as a fundamental liberty,
holding that the arbitrary exclusion of homosexuals from numerous employment oppor-
tunities by a public utility violated the state equal protection provision.
30. For a discussion of how lesbians and gays satisfy criteria of "suspectness" recently
articulated by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976), see L
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 944-45 n. 17 (1978).
31. Some courts have invalidated statutes despite this minimal scrutiny. People v. Onofr,
72 A. D.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (statute prohibiting oral and anal sex between persons of
same sex violated the right to privacy, and distinguishing between married and unmarried
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classification, 32 states prevail with justifications such as "promotion of
morality and decency" 3 and ensuring the "efficiency" of government.
3
'
In the employment area," for example, courts have upheld dismissals of
homosexuals by ignoring or misapplying the "rational nexus" test.36 Too
often states have not even had to justify their practices by showing a
connection between homosexuality and the undermining of the state's
persons violated equal protection guarantee), affd, 51 N.Y.2d 476,415 N.E.2d 936,434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (statute prohibiting homosexual conduct violates the right to privacy
and violates equal protection because there was no rational basis for the classification). The
Baker court noted that had it reached the issue of suspectness, it would have held that
"homosexuals are not a suspect class' for equal protection purposes-since the Supreme
Court has not even concluded yet that sex is a suspect class." 553 F. Supp. at 1144
n.58.
32. The rational basis test is reviewed in Village of Belle Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1974), and in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
33. E.g.. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
34. E.g., Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (removal of employee for
homosexual conduct held not arbitrary or capricious because such conduct could be
detrimental to efficiency of employee), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 379 U.S. 951
(1964).
35. It should be noted that the United States Civil Service Commission has revised its
regulations to preclude exclusion of lesbians and gays solely on the basis of homosexual
status. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (Supp. V 1981). A United States Office of Personnel
Management Memorandum (May 12, 1980), states that employees should not be
questioned about matters unrelated to employment, including sexual orientation.
On the state level employment discrimination based on sexual orientation has been
banned in government employment by executive order in California, Exec. Order No. B-54-
79 (Apr. 4. 1979), and in Pennsylvania. Exec. Order No. 1975-5 (amended Feb. 11,
1978).
36. The rational nexus test was fiust applied by Chief Justice Bazelon in Norton v. Macy,
417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969), to protect the rights of lesbian and gay federal employees.
This test requires the government to establish a rational connection between the employee's
conduct and the employee's poor job performance before an employment sanction or
penalty can be justified. In Society for Individual Rights. Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.RD. 399
(N.D. Cal. 1973), afrd on othergrounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975), the court found no
such connection and therefore ordered the Civil Service Commission of the federal
government "to forthwith cease excluding or discharging . .. any homosexual per-
son . . . solely because the employment of such a person .. . might bring [government
service] into . . . public contempt." 63 F.R.D. at 402. This ruling led the Commission to
revise its regulations relating to job suitability criteria, see supra note 35. But see
Richardson v. Hampton. 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972) (former employee denied
employment because he refused to give Civil Service Commission information about his
status as a homosexual); Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th
Cir. 1976) (possible embarrassment to government from employing an "out-of-the-closet"
homosexual constituted the rational nexus necessary to deny employment), vacated, 429
U.S. 1034 (1977); McKeard v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff's
homosexuality and government's denial of his security clearance were rationally related
because homosexuals may be a target of coercion or pressure causing them to act contrary to




Judicial willingness to extend constitutional protections to lesbians
and gays may depend as much on the individual judge's view of
homosexuality as on the requisites of doctrine. In official opinions
denying claims by lesbians and gays, judges have called lesbians and gays
"advocates of repugnant social concepts"3 and "queers." 39 Others have
described homosexuality as "loathsome and disgusting," 4° "grossly
repugnant,"4 ' "foul,"4 2 and "unfit to be named among Christians."'43 The
Supreme Court is not immune to such bigotry. In Ratchford v. Gay Lib,"
Justice Rehnquist analogized a university's refusal to recognize a gay
student group to a measles quarantine: 4 "The question is more akin to
whether those suffering from measles have a constitutional right, in
violation of quarantine regulations, to associate together and with others
who do not presently have measles, in order to urge repeal of a state law
providing that the measle [sic] sufferers be quarantined.""4
37. E.g., Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974)
(discussions about homosexuality which offended some employees and prompted ques-
tions by clients constituted enough adverse on-job performance to deny homosexual
employment under the rational nexus test); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir.
1971) (court failed to address whether a teacher's homosexuality was rationally connected
to job performance, rather, the court adjudicated onlywhether the state university's board of
regents had acted within its power as an administrative agency to deny employment). For a
comprehensive review of the history and application of the rational nexus test to lesbian and
gay employment situations, see Rivers, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings LJ. 699,818-74 (1979). updated
in Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 Drake L Rev. 311 (1980-
1981).
38. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971).
39. United States v. Coffeeville ConsoL School Dist., 513 F.2d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 1975).
In one case, United States District Judge Andrew Hauk (S.D. Cal.), upon sentencing an alien
who was in the United States illegally, commented that, "I don't know what's happening. We
let all these Iranian ignoramuses in, but not this young man who wants to support his child.
And he isn't even a fag, like all those faggots from Cuba we're letting in." Washington Post,
Oct. 8,1980, at A1S, col 2. Judge Hauk was referring to the large percentage of lesbians and
gays among the refugees who entered the United States illegally during the summer of
1980.
40. State v. Bonanno, 245 La. 1117, 1123-24,163 S. 2d 72,74 (1964), quoted in State v.
Lindsey, 310 So. 2d 89, 91 (La. 1975).
41. People v. Rodriguez, 63 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 4, 133 Cal. Rptr. 765, 766 (1976),
quoted in Knutson, Homosexuality and the Law: Introduction, 5 J. Homosexuality 7
(1979-1980).
42. Silva v. Mun. Court. 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 739, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479, 484 (1974),
quoted in Knutson, supra note 41, at 7.
43. State v. Stokes, 274 N.C. 409, 163 S.E.2d 770 (1968), quotedin Knutson, supra note
41, at 7.
44. 434 U.S. 1080 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from cert denied) (University of
Missouri denied recognition to homosexual organization).
45. Id. at 1084.
46. Id.
1983]
Law and Inequality [Vol. 1:121
The social discrimination and barriers to legal redress encountered
by lesbians and gays illustrate the need for alternative legal strategies to
achieve equal rights under law.4" This article offers an alternative legal
theory toward that end. It argues that the first amendment covers the
public expression of lesbian/gay personhood as protected speech.
Lesbian/gay personhood, compared with its heterosexual counterpart, is
burdened in its public expression by official acts. The public expression
of heterosexual personhood is, by contrast, favored socially and legally
by tacitly being seen neither as sexual nor as speech. This occurs because
it is dominant in both arenas. The first amendment equal protection
right" to lesbian/gay public expression argues that official indulgence of
one and sanctioning of the other is discrimination. This approach casts
the heterosexual mode as but one sexuality's mode of expressing its
personhood.4 9 Once the expression of lesbian/gay personhood is seen as
speech, the alternative to protecting it is seen to chill expression,50 stifle
advocacy, and dictate "affirmation of a belief'' in the content of
heterosexuality. No exception to protected speech then appears clearly
47. A comprehensive study of this discrimination and the response of the judiciary is
beyond the scope of this article and would duplicate the many scholarly works which survey
this problem. See, e.g., Rivera, supra note 37, at 799.
48. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (court held a regulation which
exempted peaceful labor picketing from its general prohibition on picketing near a school
violates the equal protection clause: "The Equal Protection clause requires that statutes
affecting first amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives"). Id.
at 101; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (using the analysis applied in Mosley, the
Court held unconstitutional a regulation which exempted peaceful picketing of a place of
employment involved in a labor dispute from a general ban on picketing of residences); see
also Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L Rev. 20
(1975).
49. Law professor Kenneth Karst warns of the dangers of transforming the first
amendment into a "generalized protection of freedom to express oneself through one's
behavior." Such a doctrinal approach, Karst claims, would stretch the first amendment to
cover all constitutional freedoms, encumbering it with new limits and exceptions. "From
these decisions, a doctrinal infection would spread, touching even traditional First
Amendment concerns." Kart, Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 Yale LJ. 624,654-55
n.140 (1981). This view is not as inconsistent with the theory set forth in this article as it
might seem. Karst refers principally to self-expression which flows from intimate
association. which he defines as"a close and familiar personal relationship with another that
is in some significant way comparable to a marriage or family relationship," id. at 629. This
article concerns expression which may not be so contextually intimate yet is no less close to
the core of the personal self. Further, while the public expression of lesbian/gay personhood,
as defined infra, stems from a homosexual orientation. it involves freedoms that have more
in common with the closeness and familiarity of that intimacy thought to characterize
marriage and family than it does with "behavior," sexual or otherwise.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 203-06.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 207-11.
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applicable.52 No state interest outweighs either this right," or the
fundamental right to the expression of lesbian/gay personhood, a right
derived from the first amendment.5 4
II. Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood
Since the Supreme Court recognized" and extended" the right to
privacy," legal literature, in its attempt to delineate the parameters of
protection provided by that right, has offered tortured philosphical
definitions of concepts such as selfhood, identity, personality and
personhood.18 According to Professor Laurence H. Tribe, 9 these defini-
tions have two serious limitations. First, they "leave essentially un-
specified the substance of what is being protected.' 60 Second, "by
focusing on the inward-looking face of privacy, [they] slight those equally
central outward-looking aspects of self that are expressed less through
demanding secrecy, sanctuary, or seclusion than through seeking to
project one identity rather than another upon the public world." 6 Tribe
adds that this public projection of identity, "the freedom to have impact
on others," is "central to any adequate conception of the self."' 2
52. See infra text accompanying notes 177-200.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 140-76.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 220-29.
55. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut statute which made useof
any drug, medicinal article, or instrument to prevent contraception illegal held an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy).
56. See Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy encompasses a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
(state procedural requirements restricting decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy
held invalid); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to privacy encompasses
access of unmarried persons to contraceptives).
57. The right to privacy and the right publicly to express one's personality are
complementary interests of personhood. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
This article, while focusing on public expression of lesbian/gay personhood, complements
writings on lesbians' and gays' right to privacy. See Richards, SexualAutonomy and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 Hastings LJ. 957 (1979); Richards, UnnaturalActs and the Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 Fordham L Rev. 1281 (1977); Richards,
Homosexual Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 5 J. Homosexuality 43
(1980).
58. E.g., CommentA Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, andlntimate Decision,
64 Calif. L Rev. 1447 (1976); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 233
(1977); Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 295 (1974-1975); Craven,
Personhoo& The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 Duke LJ. 699, cited in L Tribe, supra note
30, at 887-91.
59. L Tribe, supra note 30.
60./d. at 887.
61. Id. at 887-88.
62./Jd at 888.
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Tribe's analysis suggests that prior students of personhood have
addressed only the private side, to the neglect of the public side, of
personhood:
[S] uch seemingly disparate matters as the protection of one's good
name, the selection of one's appearance or apparel, the choice of
symbols one publicly endorses, and the choice of one's com-
panions-many of which have received widespread judicial pro-
tection from too easy a habit of governmental interference-are all
reflections of [the] outward-looking dimension of selfhood or
personality and yet seem artificially severed from the more intro-
spective side of the 'right to be let alone' in the categorizations
attempted to date.6
An adequate definition of personhood must encompass the public, as well
as the private, dimensions of social being. Personhood in this article
includes, but is not limited to, one's identity, intimacy," intellect,
interest, tastes, and personality, " in their outward projection to the
public world 6 as well as in their introspective relegation to secrecy,
sanctuary, and seclusion.'"
Under this definition, sexual orientation is an integral component of
personhood.68 Sexual orientation refers to the direction of one's sexuality
or erotic feelings, whether heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or some
combination of these over time. Courts which have struck down sodomy
statutes as unconstitutional violations of the right to privacy have
recognized the centrality of intimate sexual conduct-heterosexual or
homosexual-to the human personality. 6" In perhaps the most far-
reaching opinion on the right to privacy, a New York appellate court,7 0
63. Id
64. Gerety, supra note 58, at 236.
65. Ben Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964,975 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (Army
regulation permitting discharge of any solidier with homosexual tendencies, desire, or
interest but who had committted no overt homosexual acts, violated first amendment and
the constitutional right to privacy).
66. L Tribe, supra note 30, at 888.
67. Id. at 887.
68. Theories abound on the causes of homosexuality. See L Tribe, supra note 30, at 944-
45 n.17; J. Hart & D. Richardson, The Theory and Practice of Homosexuality 5-37 (1981).
None has been conclusively proven. Scientific consensus at the moment seems to be that the
individual does not control the development of sexual orientation. Id. Furthermore, most
scientists agree that, with rare exceptions. an individual cannot change a homosexual
orientation once it is established. Id. Available evidence cannot establish the determinants
of sexual orientation for public policy purposes, however, because so long as hetero-
sexuality is compulsory, it will be impossible to separate any innate factors from social
compulsion from free choice.
69. E.g., People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268,271,424 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568, affd, 51 N.Y.2d
476, 415 N.E.2d 936,434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cer. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
70. People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268,424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980).
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later upheld by the state's highest court," declared that:
Personal sexual conduct is a fundamental right protected by the
right to privacy because of the transcendental importance of sex to
the human condition, the intimacy of the conduct, and its relation-
ship to a person's right to control his or her own body. . . . The
right is broad enough to inelude consensual acts between non-
married persons and intimate consensual homosexual conduct.72
A dual private-public characterization of personhood recognizes
that private expression of a homosexual orientation carries with it
significant free speech implications. "The right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of 'individual freedom of mind.'"" One federal court has
recognized the importance to lesbian/gay personhood of its public
expression:
The ninth amendment protects the privacy of one's personality,
while the first amendment protects manifestations of that person-
ality, and it is only when one's personality, no matter how bizarre or
potentially dangerous, actually manifests itself in the form of
unlawful conduct, that government may intercede in an effort to
control personality or restrict its manifestation. A homosexual
personalit y--formed genetically or by human experience, the
product of deliberate choice or predetermination-may be dis-
pleasing, disgusting, and immoral to many. These, however, are
social judgments, not ingredients for gauging constitutional
permissibility. "'
People should be able to control their own social being, unfettered by
governmental regulation absent the most compelling state interests. This
article argues that the outward expression of this two-dimensional
personhood, as an expressive or communicative manifestation of a
lesbian/gay personhood, is protected under the first amendment."
Freedom of speech is important not only as a means to an end, but
as an end in itself-something commentators usually fail to recognize.
Professor Tribe points out the inadequacy of Holmes' "marketplace of
71. People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566, affd 5I N.Y.2d 476, 415
N.E.2d 936. 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
72. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d. at 271, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
73. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,637 (1943), quoted in Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705. 714 (1977) (state statute which compels individual to
disseminate an ideological message by displaying it on his private property violates first
amendment).
74. Ben Shalom v. Army, 489 F. Supp. at 976 (emphasis added).
75. Although this article focuses on the public expression of lesbian/gay personhood,
pursuing the argument that public and private aspects of personhood cannot arbitrarily be
severed, it is necessary to keep in mind the private dimension of personhood as welL
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ideas" and Meiklejohn's "speech-as-essential-to-self-government" the-
ories, both of which regard speech as a means to an end.7" He criticizes
them for focusing too much on intellect and rationality and, as a result,
failing to accommodate the emotive role of free expression in the
evolution, definition, and proclamation of individual and group iden-
tity."7 A better vision of free speech, Tribe argues, is set forth by Justice
Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California:79 "Those who won our
independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free
to develop their faculties. . . . They valued liberty both as an end and
as a means." 9 The Tribe-Brandeis vision of free speech accommodates
and supports -the public expression of lesbian/gay personhood. This
vision includes speech as "an expression of self,"' enhancing "personal
growth and self-realization,"'" and as "a constitutive part of personal and
group autonomy. "82
Lesbians and gays already project their personhood to the public
world through an infinite number of expressive activities, in a variety of
settings, as they interact with others outside their private spheres. In a
social context, lesbians and gays may choose to visit public or semi-public
places where only other lesbians and gays congregate. In an appropriate
public forum, they may choose to express themselves through activities
such as same-sex dancing.83
In a political context, lesbians and gays express personhood
through such actions as discussions about homosexuality, demonstra-
tions or marches in support of lesbian orgay rights, statements to the news
media about the rights of lesbians and gays, and testimony before a
political body in support of favorable civil rights legislation. They may
choose to engage in symbolic speech, such as wearing insignia of the
lesbian and gay struggle for equal rights, or expressive conduct, such as
publicly displaying affection" to protest a city ordinance proscribing
such activity.
76. L Tribe, supra note 30, at 579.
77. Id. at 578.
78. 274 U.S. 357 (1972). In Whitney v. California the majority of the Supreme Court
held that the California criminal Syndicalism Act did not violate the equal protection or due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Brandeis concurred on procedural grounds
because the arguments necessary to reverse the lower court had not been made until
appeal.
79. L Tribe, supra note 30, at 578, quoting Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. a 375
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
80. L Tribe, supra note 30, at 577.
81. Id. at 578.
82. Id.
83. One court has recognized that it is a first amendment violation for high school officials
to prohibit a male homosexual high school student from bringing a male escort to the prom.




In a cultural setting, lesbians and gays may express their person-
hood by attending lectures on some aspect of homosexuality or by giving
such a lecture. They may choose, and indeed find it necessary, to acquire
literature to help understand their sexual condition, to help others
understand theirs, or to help society in general to learn about homosex-
uality. In a religious context, lesbians or gays may choose to worship with
a congregation or religious society which does not view homosexuality as
inconsistent with the tenets of Christianity, Judaism, or other faiths.'"
The right to the public expression of personhood is inextricably
bound to the complementary right to private expression. Only together do
these components of personhood allow the person to be whole. This
concept of personhood is the necessary response to those who claim to
support the right of lesbians and gays to be themselves, while advocating
that lesbian and gay lifestyles be left "in the closet." 6 This concept of
personhood is also necessary to respond to judges who fail to recognize
that disadvantaging lesbians and gays because they "flaunt"" their
lifestyles is a discriminatory abridgment of free speech in its most
invidious form.
While by some definitions sexual conduct can be confined to the
bedroom, sexual orientation-homosexual or heterosexual-hence,
sexual personhood, does not stay in the closet. Heterosexual society
revolves around its sexual orientation. Only persons of the opposite sex
are granted marriage licenses. Employees are expected to take their
opposite-sex spouses to summer picnics and holiday parties. Politicians
parade with their opposite-sex spouses, and may kiss them in public to
win a few votes. High school students boast about the opposite-sex dates
they are accompanying to the prom. Adults at the office cafeteria table talk
about their opposite-sex social lives. Indeed, heterosexual society
unabashedly "flaunts" its lifestyle, its personhood. Yet lesbians and gays
similarly situated must often confine their lifestyles to the silence of the
closet.
A society which allows lesbians and gays to express their person-
hood only in private forces them to live a public lie. Such compelled deceit
takes a great psychological toll"' on those forced to wear a heterosexual
85. The All God's Children Metropolitan Community Church, for example, with 178
congregations throughout the world, is a church established by lesbian and gay clergy for the
spiritual needs of lesbians and gays.
86. For one such view see 67 Harv. L Rec., Nov. 16, 1978, at 11, col. 3. In a letter to the
editor, a Harvard Law School graduate suggests that gay persons should stay in the closet so
that children will not see them as role models.
87. See Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 256 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
88. See generaLly, B. Adam. The Survival of Domination: Inferiorization and Everyday
Life (1978); A. Bell Homosexualities: A Study of Diversity Among Men and Women
(1978); C. Tripp, The Homosexual Matrix (1975).
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mask. Compelled heterosexuality" requires "affirmation of a belief and
an attitude of mind"" and denies lesbians and gays the "right of self-
determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal
attitude."" Such compelled speech "invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution
to reserve from all official control.""'
Forcing public expression of a belief is an affront to personal
integrity. It can indeed be considered an invasion of the consti-
tutional right to privacy, established in Griswold v. Connecticut, as
well as an abridgment of freedom of expression.'3
If the guarantees of the first amendment are to extend to the
expression of lesbian/gay personhood, majoritarian heterosexual society
must learn to appreciate the truthful expression of personhood and decry
its false profession. Heterosexual society must judge lesbian and gay
couples by at least the same standards it uses to judge heterosexual
couples in their public expression of sexual orientation." Lesbian and gay
employees must feel free to take persons of the same sex to office parties
and feel free to introduce them as lovers or whatever term may evolve in a
freer society. Lesbian and gay high school students must be free to take
persons of the same sex to the prom." Lesbian and gay politicians must
feel free to introduce their companions at political rallies. Lesbians and
gays at the office cafeteria must feel free to discuss their same-sex social
lives with others who discuss their heterosexual social lives. In essence,
lesbians and gays must be accepted or rejected, agreed or disagreed with,
voted for or against, ignored or listened to, laughed or cried with or at as
persons.
III. Public Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as
Constitutionally Protected Speech
A. Regulation of Lesbian/Gay Speech is Content-Based
There are now many policies and regulations which, facially or
implicitly, disallow or discourage public expressions of lesbian/gay
89. Rich. Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, supra note 1.
90. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (requiring
Jehovah Witness children to salute flag and give pledge of allegiance as prerequisite to
continued attendance at public school violates their freedom of speech and freedom of
religion).
91. Id. at 631.
92.Id. at 642.
93. T. Emerson. The System of Freedom of Expression 30 (1970).
94. Perhaps, in light of the perspective and experiences of lesbians and gays, these
standards also need to be reconsidered.
95. Fricke v. Lynch. 491 F. Supp. 381.
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personhood. The first amendment must protect such expressions either
as pure speech, or as symbolic or expressive conduct with sufficient
"communicative content [to fall] within the ambit of the first amend-
menL"" The cases which recognize a first amendment equal protection
right envision equal protection interests "intertwined with" '97 or "in its
intersection with""3 first amendment interests. This doctrine protects
equality rights in speech under "the Equal Protection clause, not to
mention the First Amendment itself."' Once an interest is seen to fall
within first amendment bounds, the equal protection clause requires that
state regulations that impinge on it not be discriminatory as to content,
but rather "be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives."'O°
Disallowing a regulation that "discriminate[d] between lawful and
unlawful conduct based upon the content of the demonstrator's com-
munication,"' 0 ' the Court said:
When government regulation discriminates among speech-related
activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection clause mandates
that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state
interests and the justification offered for any distinction it draws
must be carefully scrutinized."2
Dissenting in that case, Justice Rehnquist would have held the state to a
different substantive standard-whether an "appropriate governmental
interest [is] suitably furthered by the differential treatment'10 3-but, like
the majority, applied "Equal Protection requirements in the First
,Amendment context.'"04 Some courts have been receptive to claims by
lesbians and gays under the first amendment in a way that points to an
incipient recognition consistent with the more extensive equal protection
to lesbian/gay personhood urged in this article. This fuller protection
,from discrimination is essential for realizing the social value of individual
self-fulfillment and full human character and potential' 0' that the first
amendment rests upon.
State agents who authorize, enforce, and uphold regulations which
suppress the public expression of lesbian/gay personhood unwittingly
undermine the first amendment. In their haste to label such expression
96. Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 660 (1st Cir.
1974).
97. Police Dept of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
98. Id. at 101.
99. Id. at 96.
100. Id. at 101.
101. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980).
102. Id. at 461.62.
103. Id. at 481 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104.Id.
105. T. Emerson, supra note 93, at 6.
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offensive and abhorrent,' 06 some courts seem to have forgotten that the
stifling of advocacy is also offensive and abhorrent.0'0 Others have
recognized, sometimes reluctantly, that the first amendment does not
except lesbians and gays from its protections. Perhaps in response to
lesbian and gay activism, a few courts have even begun to recognize the
importance of protecting the broader panoply of rights included in
lesbian/gay personhood under the first amendment.' 0s The first amend-
ment guarantees that government ordinarily cannot restrict expression
because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content. State action
aimed at suppressing some communication, while allowing other com-
munication to be free, is at odds with the first amendment' 0 9 Yet, states
suppress communication, and restrict its impact, when they restrict the
public expression of lesbian/gay personhood.
States frequently attempt to regulate the message of lesbian/gay
personhood, even when conveyed through pure speech or expressive
conduct. In many such instances, courts have recognized, although not
yet adequately, that such regulation is unconstitutional. The federal
government has fired employees for displaying personality traits con-
sidered unsuitable for government workers10 and for "flaunting" a gay
lifestyle."' One job seeker's offer of employment was withdrawn because
he insisted on the "right to pursue an activist role in implementing his
unconventional ideas concerning the societal status to be accorded
homosexuals and thereby to foist tacit approval of [a] socially repugnant
concept upon his employer."" 2 School districts have fired teachers
because they are homosexual,"' and for creating publicity through
106. See supra notes 40.43.
107. "IT] he ideas advocated by an association may to some or most of us be abhorrent, even
sickening. The stifling of advocacy is even more abhorrent, even more sickening." Gay
Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 1976) (Markey, C.J.,
concurring).
108. See, e.g., infra notes 116-19.
109. L Tribe, supra note 30, at 581.
110. Norton v. Macy. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (an employee's discharge from
employment violated his consitutional rights to privacy and due process of law where the
basis for the dismissal was possible embarrassment to a government agency relating to a
single homosexual advance made by the employee in private during off-hours).
111. Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 256 (9th Cir. 1976)
(government could deny an individual employment where he publicly announced his
homosexual activities; individual's fifth amendment due process and first amendment free
speech interest outweighed by the government's interest in efficient public service).
112. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1046 (1972) (emphasis omitted) (employee's fourteenth amendment rights to equal
protection and due process were not denied when he was discharged because his active role
in implementing his unconventional ideas gave his employer, the Board of Regents of the
state university, grounds for his dismissal).
113. See Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5,353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Or.
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statements about homosexuality to the press."14 Others have required
homosexual teachers to submit to psychiatric examinations."s Univer-
sities have refused to recognize lesbian and gay student organizations,",
and have not allowed such organizations to hold social functions." 7
Universities have also denied such student groups the use of school
facilities on the ground that it is not in the best interest of the university."'
One state curtailed such group activities when the governor threatened to
cut off all university funds unless the university's board of trustees
purged the state's campuses of"indecency... filth" and "socially abhor-
rent activities.""' Another state denied a group the right to advertise its
counseling, legal aid, and library services in the student newspaper.'2
In Ohio, the secretary of state refused to incorporate a student organi-
zation because "the promotion of homosexuality as a valid life style" was
contrary to state public policy.' 2 ' While in many of these cases lesbians
and gays have successfully challenged state actions aimed at curtailing
1973) (court held statute, pursuant to which school board dismissed a lesbian teacher, void
for vagueness), affid, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); contra,
Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (court upheld
discharge of gay teacher because it found substantial evidence supported trial court's
conclusions that the teacher was guilty of immorality and that, known as gay, his ability to
teach was impaired), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
114. Aumiller v. University of DeL, 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (D. Del. 1977) (state
university violated lecturer's first amendment rights of free expression and association by
refusing to renew his contract because of his statements about homosexuality in newspaper
articles).
115. Gish v. Board of Educ., 145 N.J. Super. 96,101-02,336 A.2d 1337,1339-40 (1976)
(board of education's directive that a teacher submit to a psychiatric examination,
predicated on the board's determination that the teacher's role as president of a gay rights
organization displayed evidence of deviation from normal mental health which might affect
his ability to teach, did not violate the teacher's first and fourteenth amendment rights).
116. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 853 (8th Cir. 1977) (university's refusal
to recognize Gay Lib organization held an unconstitutional abridgment of first amendment
rights), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
117. Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (lst Cir. 1974)
(court held that precluding gay student'organization from holding social functions on
campus of state university denied members of the organization their ffirst amendment right
of association).
118. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543,545 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (court held denying gay
student organization the use of school facilities for a conference and dance is an infringement
on the members' first amendment rights of free speech, assembly and association).
119. Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H., 509 F.2d 652.
120. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1074 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusal
of editor of state university student newspaper to publish an off-campus gay organization's
advertisement did not violate the organization's rust amendment rights), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 982 (1977).
121. State ex rel. Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 113-14, 313 N.E.2d 847, 848
(1974) (secretary of state properly refused on public policy grounds to accept the articles of
incorporation for the proposed nonprofit corporation which had as its purpose the
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the right to publicly express lesbian/gay personhood, courts have not yet
fully recognized the necessary scope of the first amendment interests
implicated in them.
One area in which courts have been especially unwilling to overturn
state action is liquor licensing. Courts have allowed states to deny and
revoke liquor licenses of businesses that cater to a homosexual clientele'22
or admit patrons with characteristics evidencing homosexual propen-
sities.'12 In an astonishing opinion which has not been overruled, a state
court upheld revocation of a bar's license because the bar admitted
clientele who "appeared to be homosexuals."'2 The-court acknowledged
that no evidence established that either the specified patrons were
actually homosexuals 2s or that "licentious solicitations" occurred on the
premises.' 2' Enunciating a policy of "nipping reasonably apprehended
evils in the bud," the court stated:
[I] f the evidence here failed adequately to prove that the described
patrons were in fact homosexuals, it certainly proved that they had
the conspicuous guise, demeanor, carriage, and appearance of such
personalities. It is often in the plumage that we identify the
bird. '
The court was concerned that "public taverns [not] be converted into
recreational fraternity houses for homosexuals." 2s In yet another
case, a Florida court upheld the constitutionality of a city ordinance
making it illegal for a licensed establishment to "knowingly sell to, serve,
or allow a homosexual person to consume alcoholic beverages, or to
knowingly allow two or more homosexual persons to congregate or
remain in [the] place of business."' 2
promotion of homosexuality as a valid life style), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916
(1975).
122. Paddock Bar, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 46 N.J. Super. 405.134
A.2d 779 (1957) (suspension of liquor license of establishment admitting clientele who
appeared to be homosexual upheld under the state alcoholic beverage control statute).
123. Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 27 A.D.2d 918, 278 N.Y.S.2d 951
(although a mere congregation of homosexuals did not render an establishment disorderly
within the meaning of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, where homosexual patrons were
soliciting as homosexuals, and exhibiting characteristics and mannerisms evidencing
homosexual propensities, revocation of establishment's liquor license was justified),
modified, 21 N.Y.2d 111, 233 N.E.2d 833, 286 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1967).
124. Paddock Bar, Inc., 46 N.J. Super. at 407, 134 A.2d at 779 (emphasis added).
125. I& at 408, 134 A.2d at 780.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 408-09, 134 A.2d at 780.
128. Id at 408, 134 A.2d at 780.
129. Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. Dist. CL App.) (court held valid a
Miami ordinance prohibiting liquor licensee from knowingly employing a lesbian or gay or
serving them), crt. denied, 201 So. 2d 895 (Fla.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1967).
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Homosexual status linked to u hat for any other group would be
recognized as conventional first amendment acti% it. has also been the
justification for sanctions against lesbians and gays. " In Gaylord v.
Tacoma School District No. 10,"' the school district fired a twelve-year
secondary school teacher with an outstanding record solely because of his
homosexual status. The court criticized Gaylord for actively seeking out
the company of other male homosexuals and participating in the Dorian
Society, an organization with social and political goals.'" By this activity,
the court said, Gaylord assumed the risk that his homosexuality would be
discovered. ' In other"homosexual status" cases, individuals have been
denied securit. clearances,' 34 naturalization,'" and admission to the
state bar.'""
These cases illustrate state regulations aimed at suppressing not
only the advocacy of homosexuality, but also its outward expression-a
form of its social existence- either through pure speech or expressive
conduct. The state justifies the abridgment of this expression because it
believes either that its content is offensive to majoritarian heterosexual
social values or that its public projection would have a harmful impact on
the goals of the majoritarian heterosexual society. In the liquor licensing
130. See infra text accompanying notes 202-19.
131.88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, (court upheld discharge of gay teacher because
substantial evidence supported trial court's conclusions that the teacher was guilty of
immorality and that, known as gay, his ability to teach was impaired), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 879 (1977).
132. Id. at 294, 559 P.2d at 1344.
133. Id. at 297. 559 P.2d at 1346.
i 34. Cayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the court determined
that "sexual perversion," one of the criteria set out by the Industrial Security Clearance
Review Office to determine eligibility for a security clearance, includes homosexual activity,
the court suggests that if a rational nexus is found between an individual's homosexual
activity and the individual's ability to safeguard classified information, a security clearance
could be denied).
135. Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (court held that
an alien, who at the time of his entry into the United States was a homosexual, was not
eligible for a visa and admission to the United States under § 212 (a) (4) of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act of 1952 as one "affected with (a] psychopathic personality," a term
in which Congress intended to include homosexuals). Contra In re Labady, 326 F. Supp.
924, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (naturalization could not be denied under 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (a)
(1976) to a homosexual determined to be of good moral character under that provision
where he had been lawfully admitted to the United States and was a lawful resident); In re
Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (D. Or. 1975) (naturalization cannot be denied on
grounds of homosexuality where individual was of lawful moral character within the
meaning of naturalization provision 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1976) and where the other
requirements of that provision had been lawfully waived).
136. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners. 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978) (admission to the state bar
cannot be denied solel. because of applicant's homosexuality; court limits its discussion to
homosexual orientation and expressly does not address itself to circumstances where
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cases, the state blatantly restricted the right of association; but these cases
also implicate the right to free speech insofar as the state constrains
expression.
This content-based abridgment of the expression of lesbian/gay
personhood is impermissable unless the state can show either that the
regulation is justified by a substantial state interest' " or that the
expression falls under one of the exceptions to protected speech. The
challenged governmental act must be the narrowest means of achieving
the government's permissible objectives.' 38 Many courts recognize in a
lesbian/gay context that the state cannot unnecessarily infringe ex-
pressive conduct protected by the first amendment. 3 9 These cases point
to a recognition of, without yet satisfying the need for, first amendment
protection for the public expression of lesbian/gay personhood.
B. Scrutiny of Governmental Ends and Means
Various state interests have been advanced to justify the regulation
of the expression of lesbian/gay personhood, particularly in the sphere of
private sexual conduct. Prominent among these asserted interests are the
efficiency and security of government,"U promotion of marriage and
family life,' 4' and preservation of decency and morality. 12 "Carefully
scrutinized," "I these ends appear insufficiently tailored to their means-
the suppression of expression-to pass constitutional muster.'"
For example, employment discrimination against lesbians and
gays is often based on a claim that lesbian and gay employees impair
evidence has established an individual engaged in homosexual acts).
137. See infra notes 140-76 and accompanying text.
138. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-60 (1972) (state durational residency
requirements for voting, challenged under the equal protection clause, not least restrictive
means necessary for preventing fraud).
139. See e.g.. notes 116-19 supra.
140. Norton v. Macy. 417 F.2d 1161, 1166 (1969) (the court said in dicta homosexual
conduct may create a potential for blackmail which jeopardizes the security of classified
communications and homosexual conduct may in some circumstances be evidence of an
unstable personality unsuitable for certain kinds of work).
141. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney. 403 F. Supp. 1199. 1201 (E.D. Va. 1975),
summarily affd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (constitutional right to privacy does not extend to
sodomy).
142. Id. at 1202.
143. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980).
144. In Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), the court found that the
sodomy statute was not even rationally related to the interests articulated by the state-
morality and decency, public health, welfare, and safety, and procreation. The court said
these alleged state interests were mere "assertions of general platitudes," wholly inadequate
to impinge on the fundamental right of privacy and equal protection. Baker, 553 F. Supp.
at 1142. These alleged state interests are even less compelling in the context of freedom of
expression under the first amendment.
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efficiency either by an inability to carry out their duties properly or by
causing a general disruption of the workplace. 14 While the state has a
substantial interest in efficiency, such an interest is not sufficient to
override the right to freedom of expression. This is especially so where the
state's end of efficiency does not narrowly relate to the means employed:
the exclusion of all lesbians and gays from employment. There is no
support for the claim that lesbians and gays share some inherent inability
to perform their work.' Similarly, there is no evidence for claims that
lesbians and gays, simplyper se, are likely to disrupt the work setting by
contributing to morale or disciplinary problems."' The state's interest in
145. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d at 1166.
146. Scientific data shows no relationship between individual ability and homosexuality
per se. See, e.g., M. Freedman, Homosexuality and Psychological Functioning 35-45
(1971); H. Ruitenbeck, Homosexuality: A Changing Picture 67 (1973); Chance, Facts
That Liberated the Gay Community, Psychology Today, Dec. 1975, at 52 (interview with
Evelyn Hooker); The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual, 31 J. Psychology 18
(1957). See generally, Homosexuality: Social, Psychological, and Biological Issues (W.
Paul ed. 1982). The American Psychiatric Association trustees ruled in 1973 that homo-
sexuality would no longer be included as a "mental disorder" in its official list of mental
disorders. The APA on that day also adopted the following resolution:
Whereas homosexuality in and of itself implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability, or vocational capabilities, therefore, be it
resolved, that the American Psychiatric Association deplores all public and
private discrimination against homosexuals in such areas as employment,
housing, public accommodation, and licensing, and declares that no burden
of proof of such judgment, capacity, or reliability shall be placed upon
homosexuals greater than that imposed on any other persons. Further, the
APA supports and urges the enactment of civil rights legislation at local, state
and federal levels that would insure homosexual citizens the same protec-
tions now guaranteed to others. Further, the APA supports and urges the
repeal of all legislation making criminal offenses of sexual acts performed by
consenting adults in private.
American Psychiatric Association Press Release (Dec. 15, 1973) (emphasis added). In
resolutions with nearly identical language to that above, the American Psychological
Association in 1975 voted to support the American Psychiatric Association's actibn. In
addition, the former organization urged "all mental health professionals to take the lead in
removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated with homosexual
orientations." American Psychological Association Press Release (Jan. 24, 1975).
147. Similar arguments have been made regarding the integration of Blacks and Whites in
school and work settings. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1969) (per curiam) (racial
integration in prisons ordered despite claims that integration would upset prison security
and discipline); Armstrong v. O'Connell. 463 F. Supp. 1295, 1297, 1310 (court ordered
desegregation despite arguments that integration would lower teacher morale), settled sub
nom., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Wis. 1979), affTd,
616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980); Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 249 F. Supp. 145,
151, 154 (M.D.N.C. 1966) (court rejected plaintiffs argument that forced integration of
facult) reduced teacher morale). Accord Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
475 F. Supp. 1318, 1347 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (school segregation implies inferiority and
reduces incentive and morale), afl'd, 626 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
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avoiding disruption is substantial but insufficient without a showing of
"clear and present danger"" 8 to its functions.
To justify excluding lesbians and gays as such from state
employment because they might disrupt office efficiency offends the first
amendment in at least three ways. First, it is to act on "an undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance,""' which alone cannot justify the
abridgment of expression.'5 0
Second, the feared disruptions are more likely to be created by
those, offended by homosexuality than by the lesbian or gay employee.
Those who are offended by, or who disagree with, the expres-zion of
lesbian/gay personhood should not be allowed to veto it."' The personal
right to expression is not contingent upon the approval of others."'
Third, state regulations aimed at preventing disruption by exclud-
ing all lesbians and gays are overbroad."' The government cannot
achieve its purpose "by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."'45 ' The constitutional
problems presented by overbroad regulations aimed at stifling lesbian/
gay expression of personhood resemble those problems presented by
regulations aimed at excluding "subversives" from government em-
1041 (1981).
148. See in fra text accompanying notes 194-200.
149. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503. 508 (1969)
(school officials' fear of a disturbance caused by students wearing armbands does not
override the right to freedom of expression).
150. id. at 509.
151. See Fricke v. l.ynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980) (male students'expressionof first
amendment rights. for example, going to a high school prom together. could not he
prohibited because of possible violence by other students).
152. Cf Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital. 537 F.2d 361. 369 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1976)
(exercise of rights should not be contingent on absence of adverse sentiment): Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292. 304 (D. Tex. 1982) ('mployer's female-onl.
hiring polie) violates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: w\ is not a bona fide
occupational qualification for hiring flight attendants despite employer's allegation of
"customer preference" for women).
153. Another feature of state regulations looking to efficiency compounds their impact upon
freedom of expression:
[l'he restrictions are usually framed as administrative regulation- rather
than criminal offenses. Hence the safeguards of a criminal proceeding are
lacking. Rules relating to the burden of proof, the admission of evidence, the
necessity of a judicial tribunal, are all relaxed or abandoned. It is possible.
moreover, to initiate a proceeding or disqualify an applicant on a showing
substantially less than is required to commence a criminal prosecution.
T. Emerson, supra note 93, at 162-63.
154. NAACP,.. Alabama ex re!. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (individuals organized
to prevent racial discrimination protected from governmental interference because the
members of the organization were simply exercising their right to free association protected
by the first amendment).
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ployment.' The impact of such regulations on lesbians and gays is
virtually identical to that on persons thought to be "subversives." The
impact is direct when lesbians and gays feel compelled to forego
expression oftheir personhood in order to qualify for employment.,56 The
impact is indirect when they "seek to avoid future trouble by steering
clear of controversial opinions or association. . . . The more extensive
the restrictions and the longer they remain in operation the more
pervasive becomes the dampening effect [on expression]."'
Another state interest argued to be compelling to justify regulation
of lesbian/gay expression is the preservation of majoritarian heterosexual
marriage and family arrangements. While such an interest is arguably
substantial, it is not clearly true that homosexuality undermines
conventional marriage and family life- one judge has termed such a claim
"unworthy of judicial response."' 8 Concern about defection from
heterosexuality implies that "homosexual preference is so strong and
heterosexual preference is so weak (and conventional family life so
unattractive) that people would tend to abandon heterosexual marriage if
homosexuality were legitimized.""' One commentator observes alter-
natively that "the attractions of heterosexual marriages are deep-seated
and permanent features of the human condition."'" If this is true, it
would be irrational to "suppose that to legitimize homosexuality as a way
of life would detract from the family at all."' 
Ironically, the suppression of homosexuality may contribute more
to the deterioration of conventional marriage and family arrangements
than its affirmation would. Lesbians and gays now prohibited from
entering same-sex relationships may feel pressured into entering
heterosexual marriages. Predictably, such marriages often end in
155. See T. Emerson, supra note 93 at 161-204, for a first amendment analysis of internal
security cases.
156. Id. at 162.
157. Id.
158. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhge, J., dissenting).
159. Richards, HomosexualActs and the Constitutional Right to Privacy.supra note 57,
at 61 (1980).
160. Id.
161. Id. Underlying these divergent views is a controversy over the reality and meaning of
"the family." Defenders of traditional values see it as a place of security, warmth,
individuality, and autonomy, the crucible of personhood. When they adopt this view,
'lesbians and gays seek access to family values, the only change being that the partners are of
the same-as opposed to different-sex. Feminists have criticized the family as a place of
battery, marital rape, compulsory maternity, and forced unwaged labor, the crucible of male
supremacy. In this view, undermining the structure of the family appears desirable, and
carries different implications for women than for men, hence different resonances for
lesbians than for gays.
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divorce. t6 This is unfair to the parties involved and contributes to the
breakdown, rather than the preservation, of the institution of marriage.
There is thus little relationship between state suppression of the
expression of lesbian/gay personhood and the promotion of majoritarian
heterosexual family and marriage arrangements.
Yet another state interest asserted to proscribe homosexual con-
duct is the promotion of "morality and decency." ' 63 However, states
cannot be allowed to use this justification to prohibit the public
expression of lesbian/gay personhood if the "autonomous control over
the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and
personality"" 4 is to remain among the rights protected by the first
amendment. Because the public expression of lesbian/gay personhood
need not involve sexual conduct and need not appeal to any prurient
interest,"65 it is not, by definition, obscene, and states cannot use this
justification to prohibit it. At most, the public expression of lesbian/gay
personhood ad% ocates sexual conduct, but mere advocacy is protected
speech.166 Nor may a state abridge lesbian/gay expression because it finds
the content of the views abhorrent. "' The constitution's guarantee is not
limited to the expression of conventional or majoritarian ideas. The
Supreme Court has underscored this point: A state cannot, consistently
with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression,
excise, as offensive conduct, one particular scurrilous epithet from
the public discourse, either upon the theory that its use is inherently
likely to cause violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that
the states, acting as guardians of public morality may properly
remove [an] offensive word from the public vocabulary. "
An earnest examination by the courts of the moral questions
surrounding homosexuality must include moral implications on both
sides. The courts could start by asking: What are the psychological and
social consequences of denying lesbians and gays the right to express
their identity?' 9 Can intrusion into matters so integral to the personality
162. See D.J. West, Homosexuality, 68-69, 239 (3d ed. 1968).
163. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
164. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
165. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity test includes the element that
the work or act, taken as a whole, must appeal to the prurient interest in sex).
166. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447-78 (1969) (state may not forbid advocacy of
unlawful conduct unless such advocacy is directed toward inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to produce such action).
167. Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (mere disagreement with student
group's philosophy afforded no reason to deny official recognition to group).
168. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971) (emphasis added).
169. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (segregation in schools
generates feelings of inferiority in Black children and affects their motivation to learn).
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be justified? Can a central component of the lesbian/gay personality be
excised and lesbians and gays still be expected to function as productive
members of society? May certain acts and expression be morally
prohibited, knowing that such acts and speech are important to the
dignity of lesbians and gays, as well as to their self-fulfillment? Do not
these moral demands silence speech, when the right of lesbians and gays
to speak out should be protected? Does society gain or lose anything from
this imposed silence? Is not the state's "right to control the moral content
of a person's thoughts," supposed to be "wholly inconsistent with the
philosophy of the first amendment"?'70
These questions reveal genuine issues which most courts that have
had the chance have not faced. One federal court that has acknowledged
the importance of both private and public expression of lesbian/gay
personality dismissed moral considerations as "social judgments, not
ingredients for gauging constitutional permissibility.""' Too often,
however, courts and legislatures, apparently driven by a desire to
promote the majoritarian standard of morality, create and allow untold
human suffering."
The first amendment was adopted to prevent majoritarian values
from suppressing unpopular speech, and to prevent state action from
interfering with its expression, unless the state can show such expression
is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to produce such action.""' If the state feels that the unregulated
expression of lesbian/gay personhood threatens its social interests, the
-state should foster more speech, not suppression. This principle, first
declared by Justice Brandeis,"' was recently reaffirmed by a unanimous
court:
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education the remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency
can justify repression.'
The state interests examined above collide with the first amend-
ment because the), are aimed at coercing lesbians and gays to conform to
the social norms of the heterosexual majority. " [F] reedom of expression
must receive full protection. . . . No matter how deviant the expression
170. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969)..
171. Ben Shalom v. Secretary of the Army. 489 F. Supp. 964,976 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
172 See supra nole 146.
173. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
174. Whitne% v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.. concurring at 372).
175. l.inmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,97 (1977). quoting
:lT'hitnPy, 274 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
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may be-how obnoxious or intolerable it may seem-the expression
cannot be suppressed."'' 
C. Not an Exception to Protected Speech
Lacking a substantial state interest, the content-based abridgment
of the public expression of lesbian/gay personhood is permissible only if
that expression falls under one of the narrow exceptions to protected
speech. The Supreme Court has to date limited these exceptions to
expression which can be characterized as "fighting words,"' 7 obscene"$
or defamatory,' or which present a "clear and present danger."I Only
the "fighting words" and "clear and present danger" exceptions are
relevant for analysis here, since the public expression of lesbian/gay
personhood as defined here is not defamatory or obscene."'
The "fighting words" doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme
Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"s2 placed outside the protection
of the first amendment those expressions "which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.""' 3 While
some persons react violently to the mere expression of lesbian/gay
personhood,'" such occurrences are insufficient to classify such
expression as "fighting words."
An application of the "fighting words" doctrine" s so broad as to
prohibit speech merely because it might provoke a violent reaction is
unconstitutional." 6 When an American flag was burned while uttering
scornful words, the Court said:
Though it is conceivable that some listeners might have been moved
to retaliate upon hearing appellant's disrespectful words, we cannot
lay that appellant's remarks were so inherently inflammatory as to
come within that small class of fighting words which are 'likely to
176. T. Emerson, supra note 93, at 45.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 182-93.
178. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (the state can regulate "works which.
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political. or'scientific value").
179. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
180. See infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
181. The public expression of lesbian/gay personhood as defined in this article need not
involve sexual conduct, a necessary element to establish obscenity. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
182. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
183. Id. at 572.
184. See Growing Terror of Gay Bashing, Newsweek, Mar. 23, 1981, at 30.
185. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
186. Id. at 592.
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provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach
(of the Ieace.' '
The broad protection of speech, despite "public inconvenience, annoy-
ance, or unrest,"' 85 was recognized twenty years earlier 's when Justice
Douglas stated for the majority that "a function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute."I' 9 Indeed, said Justice
Douglas, this function may "best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger."'' Justice Douglas understood that speech is
often provocative and challenging and that "[it may strike at prejudices
and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance of an idea." 92 Expression is protected even in the face of
retaliation by a hostile or disquieted listener or onlooker.
The Court has narrowed the application of the "fighting words"
doctrine by requiring that the speech in question be directed specifically
and personally at the individual who is incited to commit an immediate
breach of the peace. 93 Lesbians and gays do not generally direct their
expressions of personhood at any particular person, nor do they intend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Thus, the public projection of lesbian/gay personhood does not
constitute "fighting words" merely because some persons react violently
to it. Nor does its very utterance inflict injury because some persons
exposed to it are offended. To prohibit speech on this basis undermines
the first amendment which demands particularly vigilant judicial
protection when opposition or violent reaction is based on majoritarian
values. If the first amendment is to be meaningful, the Court must protect
the expression of the homosexual minority against suppression by the
heterosexual majority.
The"clearand present danger" rule,' 9' as articulated by Holmes in
187. Id. quotin.g Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
188. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
189. Id.
190. Id. at I.
191. Id.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. See Hess v. Indiana. 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Cooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 () 971). In Cohen. one reason the Court gave for reversing
the defendant's conviction for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" was that
"I n]o individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words
on appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult." Id. at 20. The Court also noted the lack of
,showing that anyone w'ho saw Cohen was in fact %iolently aroused or that appellant
intended such a result." Id.
194.See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (mailing anti-draft circulars during
World War I not protected b% first amendment). This rule, since its birth in 1919, has been
applied unevenl., influenced as much by political events as by the changing composition of
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.'chenck r. I nited States,' 9' gives the state the right to proscribe words
%shich "create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
stbstantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.""96 Further, "the
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremel% high before utterances can be punished."' 9' When unlawful
acts are advocated, the Court held in Brandenburg r. Ohio,"' that "[a]
State [may noti forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
iolation [unless] such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."''
TheBrandenburg test applies to situations in which the state seeks
to prevent the violation of specific laws, such as statutes prohibiting
homosexual conduct. Even assuming the constitutionality of such laws,
states that wish to prohibit speech that advocates lesbian/gay personhood
should be required to establish strict empirical. causation between such
speech and acts which violate state law. Such a showing should not even
theoreticall% support suppression where consensual homosexual acts are
not criminal.2° Nor may a state determine which conduct is legal based
upon the content of its communication. 0 ' If expression of sexual
personhood involves protected speech, laws which regulate at least some
of its more speech-like forms under the guise of regulating pure conduct
are called into question.
D. Speech Discrimination Based on Homosexual Status
Unlike most minorities, lesbians and gays have no identifying
features, such as skin color, visibly to set them apart from the general
population. A person's homosexual orientation may be revealed by force,
subterfuge, or inadvertance. Or it may be learned by peers, teachers,
employers, and others as a result of expressive activity or proclamation.
the Supreme Court. See L Tribe, supra note 30. at 608-17.
195. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
196. Id. at 52.
197. Bridges %. California, 314 U.S. 252. 263 (1941) (conviction of labor leader for
contempt of court based on his editorial criticizing a state judge held an unconstitutional
violation of freedom of speech and of the press).
198. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
199. Id. at 447.
200. F.. New York, see People v. Onofre. 72 A.D.2d 268. 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (statute
prohibiting oral and anal sex between persons of same sex and between unmarried males
and females violated right to privacy and equal protection guarantees). Iffd. 51 N.Y. 2d
476, 415 N.E.2d 936. 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980). cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981):
California, 1975 Cal. Stat. 133 (effective July 1. 1976) (consensual homosexual acts
decriminalized).
201. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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Either way, expression is involved. Any disadvantage which results
because of such expression violates the first amendment. Often, however,
it is difficult or impossible to link negative treatment to specific expressive
activity; rather, the sole basis appears to be homosexual status. Damaging
treatment on this basis should also violate the first amendment because of
its "chilling effect" on the exercise of free speech, and the "affirmation of a
belief 20 2 which it compels.
Grounded fear of retaliation on the basis of being homosexual
inhibits lesbians and gays from expressing themselves. They fear that
discovery will lead to consequences like loss of employment, eviction
from an apartment or house, and physical violence. This "indirect
inhibition or deterrence of the exercise of a constitutional right is as
odious as the direct prohibition of the exercise of that right," ' 3 because it
discourages persons from engaging in expression central to being who
they are. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to challenge
governmental action which has "only an indirect effect on the exercise of
First Amendment rights. "24
This "chilling effect" on the expression of personhood leads many
lesbians and gays to express a false heterosexual personhood to avoid
discrimination and ostracism. Indeed, for those who desire dignified and
equal treatment in heterosexual society, heterosexuality is compul-
sory. "I Lesbians and gays are compelled to choose between the denial of
merited benefits and the denial of a homosexual life. Such compulsion
"invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control." -06
This compelled expression of a false personhood infringes in-
dividual liberty even more drastically than does a compulsory flag salute
'found impermissible because it compelled an individual to "utter what is
not in his mind."20 ' The same rationale should extend to state action
which compels lesbians and gays to utter what is not in their minds, not
202. A (-.,I Virginia Stale Bd. of Educ. i. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624.633 (1943): see infra notes
206-07 and accumpan. ing text.
203. \alle% Famil. Planning %. North Dakota. 489 F. Sopp. 238.2 12 I D.N.D. 1980) (North
l)akita statute prohihiting the- funding of public agencies which make abortion ref.rrals
Siolatv the first and Fourteenth amendments because referring ip.rsons to ph-, sician who
performs aleortion is a form of speech protected by the first amendment).
201. L.aird v. Tatlum. 1M8 U .S. 1. 12- 11(1972) (allegatins uf"specific present objective
harm or a threat iifsiwcific future harm" are sufficient for challenging the constitutionalit) of
state- aetion).
205. Rich, supra note 1.
206. W st \ irginia Star Bd. of duc. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. at 642.
207. Id. at 631.
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only during a brief ceremonial moment, but throughout their entire
public lives.
Compelled affirmation of a belief is always repugnant to first
amendment values. Compelling lesbians and gays to be instruments for
fostering the state's view of heterosexuality as the only acceptable sexual
orientation is not significantly different from requiring the dissemination
of an ideological point of view. In Wooley v. Maynard'2 0s the Court found
unconstitutional the state's use of individuals as instruments to foster a
point of view which the individuals found morally, religiously, and
politically objectionable. 2°0 Serving as an instrument to propagate the
virtues of heterosexuality is equally objectionable to-lesbians and gays
who do not identify with it, who may even be politically critical of it. Such
compelled duplicity has an impact upon the intellect and spirit of a
lesbian or gay arguably more severe than is the impact of having to
display "Live Free or Die" on one's license plates.23 0 The Maynard court
recognized that "the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking
are complementary components of the broader concept of individual
freedom of mind.' Just as lesbians and gays have a right to express their
personhood, they have a right to refuse to express a false one.
Upon discovering a person's homosexuality, a state often with-
draws a benefit totally or partially. Lesbians and gays are often demoted
or fired from state jobs, teaching for example.2"2 If such action is taken
under a statute that proscribes employment of lesbian and gay teachers as
such," lesbians and gays are given advance warning that the public
expression of their personhood will result in heavy sanctions. To demote
or fire lesbians and gays because they express their personhood is
analogous to levying a press tax against persons who exercise their right to
free speech. In Grosjean v. American Press Co.,14 the Court found that
the state's motive in levying a press tax was to stifle a particular point of
view. The tax was an unconstitutional prior restraint. The motive of a state
which sanctions or legislates policies and laws against lesbians and gays
as such stifles a particular form of personhood.
208. 430 1I1.S. 705 (1977) (state statute making it a crime to obscure the words. "I.ve Free
or Die," on state license plates violates first amendment).
209. Id. at 707.
210. Id. at 717.
211. Id. at 714.
212. E.g., inAcanfors v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff teacher
was transferred to an administrative job with no student contact when his sexual orientation
was discovered. For other cases involving employment discrimination against lesbians
and gays, see Rivers, supra note 37, at 805-74.
213. See e.g., supra notes 27-28.
214. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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Sometimes the restraint on expression in lesbian/gay situations is
more direct. In Gay Lib v. University of Missouri,'s the state university
sought to have the Court uphold its denial of official recognition of a gay
student organization. The Court viewed the university's "concern for the
impact of recognition on the general relationship of the university to the
public at large"2' 6 as insufficient to justify a denial of recognition solely on
the basis of the homosexual status of the student members.
The restrictions imposed on the expression of lesbian/gay person-
hood should carry with them "a heavy presumption against [their]
constitutional validity." '' This presumption should be at least as great
when the abridgment of freedom of speech has the effect of denying people
the right to be themselves.
Sexual orientation forms an integral part of personhood ms which
one should have the right to express, with very limited exceptions, both
privately and publicly. This expression involves first amendment
acitivity which is commonplace; the only difference is that it is done in a
lesbian/gay context. Examples of public expression of lesbian/gay
personhood include discussing rights, wearing liberation insignia,
frequenting recreational accommodations, subscribing to newspapers,
marching in the streets, joining political or social organizations, and
engaging in affectionate social conduct and/or interaction, such as
dancing or holding hands on a park bench. The first amendment clearly
protects such expressive activities for heterosexuals. These activities are
part of the values and functions of freedom of expression which are an
"essential . . . means of assuring individual self-fulfillment." 2 ' Yet,
states frequently prohibit the public expression of lesbian/gay person-
hood by directly sanctioning it or by denying, or allowing to be denied,
rights and benefits, such as employment, when participation in such
expression leads to the discovery of homosexuality. Often states do not
even link sanctions to specific expressive activity, but base such
treatment on being homosexual itself.
215. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
216. Id. at 851.
217. Any system imposing prior restraint on expression carries with it a heavy presumption
against its own constitutional validity. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963), citedwith approval in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(per curiam) (where government sought to enjoin newspapers from publishing a classified
study on ground of national security, Court held that government had not met its burden of
showing justification for first amendment restraint).
218. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
219. See T. Emerson, supra note 93, at 6.
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IV. Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as a Fundamental
Right
Courts critically examine complaints that a governmental classifi-
cation burdens a fundamental right. 20 The government must then
demonstrate that it has a legitimate and substantial interest in its policies
and that its means do not "unnecessarily infringe" on the right
protected."' This intensity of examination should be applied when courts
assess policies and practices which are alleged to deny lesbians and gays
their right to expression under the first amendment.
The public expression of lesbian/gay personhood is a fundamental
right founded in the first amendment. The Supreme Court has inferred
fundamental rights from the explicit and implicit provisions of the Bill of
Rights."' In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,2 2 3
the Court stated that in determining whether a right is fundamental, "the
answer lies in assessing whether [that right is] explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." 24 The right to privacy 2 5 and its
220. See e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (Court "critically examined"
Wisconsin statute which required Wisconsin residents "having minor issue not in his
custody and which he is under obligation to support" to obtain court permission to marry;
the Court found the freedom to marry to be "a fundamental liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause"). Courts apply a strict scrutiny standard to government classifications
when complainants demonstrate that a fundamental right is at stake. The Supreme Court
has found the following rights to be fundamental: Harper v. Virginia Bd., 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) (association); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (access to
courts); Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (education).
Courts also heighten scrutiny when complainants show that the rights of a suspect
class are at stake. E.g., Graham v. Richardson 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(plurality) (sex). See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. One federal district court
has suggested that homosexuals constitute a suspect class. Noting that policies directed at
private, consensual adult homosexuality might be suspect, the court found mere knowledge
of a teacher's homosexuality to be insufficient justification for his transfer to an administra-
tive position. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 852-53 (D. Md. 1973) (court
ultimately denied relief under Civil Rights Act of 1871 as teacher's public statements and
activities in response to transfer were not "protectable" speeck court viewed such speech as
likely to incite or produce imminent affects deleterious to the educational process), aff'd on
other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
221. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
222. See e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (noting that freedom of associa-
tion is a peripheral first amendment right), Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(holding that the right of privacy emanates from the Bill of Right's penumbras); contra San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Court refused to hold that the
right to education is "fundamental"); see also cases cited supra note 220.
223. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
224. Id. at 33-34.
225. Ser Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1975).
LESBIAN/GA Y PERSONHOOD
progeny, 2 ' with the right of association,'2 are examples of rights the
Court has deemed "fundamental" beca use they are implicitly contained
in the Bill of Rights."' Unlike the rights to privacy and association, the
right to publicly express lesbian/gay personhood, once seen as a form of
speech, is protected by the express provisions of the first amendment.2 '"
Courts therefore must critically examine challenges to governmental
classifications which impinge on it.
Because the public expression of lesbian/gay personhood is a
fundamental right, founded in the first amendment, courts must heighten
their scrutiny of practices against lesbians and gays when challenged
under the equal protection or due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. This level of scrutiny will safeguard many of the rights of
lesbians and gays now set aside in deference to state interests.
V. Conclusion
Sexual orientation is integral to personhood, both its private and
public expression. Publicly, lesbian/gay personhood is manifested
through expressive conduct, symbolic speech, and pure speech. This
expression should be fully and equally protected by the first amendment
in appropriate cases, when it undermines no substantial state interest nor
falls under the narrow exceptions to protected speech. Most official
burdens on sexual orientation also infringe on lesbians' and gays' funda-
mental right to express their personhood, a right founded on the first
amendment. When such challenges are brought on these grounds, courts
must strictli examine such state policies and practices.
Judicial recognition of the right to express a lesbian/gay person-
hood will give lesbians and gays the right to express, therefore to be,
themselves. It will strengthen the foundation upon which the first
amendment rests: assuring individual self-fulfillment. "For the achieve-
ment of this self-realization the mind must be free. Hence suppression of
belief, opinion, or other expression is an affront to . . . [one's]
dignity.""10
226. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
227. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
228. See supra note 222.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 96-139.
230. T. Emerson, supra note 93, at 6.
1983]

